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Mental information processing includes both unconscious and conscious modes and there are
transitions between these two. The content of subjective experience can emerge from preconscious
content, but an opposite process of loss of conscious content or its decay from subjective experience
is an inevitable reality as well. Both ways of transition on the border between unconscious
and conscious processing are ubiquitous. But how does this transition unfold over time? While
there is quite some literature on whether conscious perception is all-or-none or graded (Sergent
and Dehaene, 2004; Overgaard et al., 2006), we ask the complementary question: how does
conscious perception change and evolve over time? While in phenomenological approaches in
the philosophy of mind all-embracing temporal perspective has been acknowledged as crucial
in understanding consciousness (e.g., anticipation, present, and retention in Husserl, 1928), in
experimental paradigms only narrow temporal slices have been typically examined.
We will first focus on the knowledge about the transitions gained from studying brief visual
stimuli. According to the microgenetic tradition mental content does not emerge instantaneously,
in an all-or-none manner (review: Bachmann, 2000). Instead, conscious content arises as a gradual
process of formation where the initial transition (there was no content and now there is some
content) grows over to a time consuming process where subjective phenomenal content of the
same intentional object matures by acquiring systematically more qualities to the preceding version
of the percept. This intentional object might be a visual object, scene, memory representation etc.
These microgenetically developing attributes or characteristics include subjective clarity, subjective
contrast, subjective fragmentariness/exhaustiveness, coarseness/detail, subjective stability, etc.
(Bachmann, 2000, 2012). In other words, conscious experience of the content pertaining to the
same intentional object changes considerably over time (See also Hegdé, 2008; Breitmeyer, 2014;
Pitts et al., 2014).
On the other hand (especially when brief objects typical to most of the experiments are
presented) a certain experience with its phenomenal subjective content sooner or later disappears
from consciousness by an analogous, but reversed gradual process—a kind of “anti-genesis”
(Bachmann, 2000). Figure 1 illustrates the notion of microgenesis with its formative and
disformative stages. Note that this figure is an abstraction based on the empiricial research
described in Bachmann (2000). However, we hope that provocatively drawing this time course
inspires researchers to investigate how it exactly looks like.
This simple conceptualization prompts surprisingly many old and new questions.
1. What is the exact shape of this curve? How do changes in stimulus parameters (e.g., contrast,
duration) change the shape?
2. Is there a kind of asymmetric inertia of formation and disformation as depicted on Figure 1?
In other words, is it indeed so that disformation takes more time than formation of
conscious content? To our mind, decay from consciousness seems to be slower mainly
because psychophysical estimates of the speed of immediate perception by masking, temporal
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FIGURE 1 | The function of conscious experience evolving over time.
(A) Microgenesis of perception with its formative and disformative stages. The
image is based on empirical research reviewed in Bachmann (2000). Note the
proposed asymmetric inertia of formation and disformation. (B) It is
conceivable that the functions over time are different for two types of
conscious experience: immediate iconic perception (blue line) and slower
memory-based experience (yellow line; see point 7 below). How is this shape
influenced by top-down factors like attention, prior knowledge or working
memory? Do these factors lead to a quicker build up and higher clarity of
conscious content (green line; see point 6 below)? The units on the Y-axis are
arbitrary units to be worked out.
order estimation, speeded discrimination, and other
experimental tasks are smaller than experimental estimates of
the duration of immediate memory (Bachmann, 2000).
3. How to experimentally measure subjective content (a) at
ymax, (b) at any optional stage of microgenesis (e.g., y =
0.4, y = 0.7)? In fact, there are many qualities of subjective
evaluation unfolding in response to stimulation or task cue
(e.g., Kalmus and Bachmann, 1980; Bachmann, 1980, 2012).
The most recent successfully used subjective scales include
the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) capitalizing on subjective
clarity ratings by subjects as well as other methods (review:
Timmermans and Cleeremans, 2015).
4. A corollary question is how subjective and objective measures
of consciousness relate. Do they show a mutually similar
formation and disformation curve over time?
5. Is there an analogous time function for unconscious
processing of content as for conscious processing? If so,
how do we disentangle the conscious and unconscious
processes (Miller, 2007; Bachmann, 2009; Aru et al., 2012;
De Graaf et al., 2012)? Note that for example Herzog
et al. (2016) propose that conscious and unconscious
processing have quite different temporal characteristics,
which might turn out to be helpful in disentangling
them.
6. How do attention, prior knowledge or working memory
content influence the shape of this curve (Figure 1B)? For
example we know that all of these factors speed up the
entry into consciousness and in general enhance the clarity
of conscious experience (e.g., Carrasco et al., 2004; Soto
et al., 2010; Aru et al., 2016). So the curve depicted on
Figure 1 should rise quicker and be higher (in terms on y-
units). But what about the disformation stage—do all of these
factors also change how quickly the content disappears from
consciousness?
7. What is the typical time course of the formative and
disformative microgenetic stages? Data from ERP and MEG
research on neural correlates of consciousness suggest that
the initial formative stage peaks at time delays around 150–
250ms (reviewed in Bachmann, 1994; Koivisto and Revonsuo,
2010). However, P300 has also been frequently found to
mark conscious experience (e.g., Sergent et al., 2005; Del
Cul et al., 2007; Rutiku et al., 2015, 2016). Intriguingly, it is
possible that there are two separate processes—(1) perceptual
microgenesis, where conscious experience emerges fast and
decays fast (possibly equal to iconic-memory decay) and
(2) immediate memory-based microgenesis, where conscious
experience of the same target forms a bit slower than
perceptual microgenesis and decays much later than iconic
delay (e.g., Sligte et al., 2008). It is even possible that while
perceptual microgenetic function decays (disformation) the
memory-based function is still building up (Figure 1B, yellow
vs. blue line). This idea fits with the distinction between
phenomenal and reflective consciousness, which are thought
to depend on different types of attention (e.g., Koivisto et al.,
2009).
Now, an intriguing theoretical question appears: if one and
the same stimulus-event is related to both, perceptual and
immediate-memorymicrogenetic processes with concomitant
two sets of NCC, should we then regard these NCC as different
aspects of one NCC or a principally different, two, NCCs
(Bachmann, 2015)?
8. How does the time course of subjective microgenesis relate
to the time course of representational content development
obtained with neural decoding and representational similarity
analysis (e.g., Carlson et al., 2013; Cichy et al., 2014; Goddard
et al., 2016)?
9. What are the relative roles of feedforward and re-entrant
neural processes in perceptual microgenesis? For example the
“reverse-hierarchy” theory of Hochstein and Ahissar (2002)
suggests that global features should emerge in consciousness
faster than the local features. This crucial prediction was
recently confirmed (Campana et al., 2016), leading to think
that conscious perception might start at the highest levels of
visual processing and acquire the fine details through feedback
from higher to lower levels of visual processing.
10. Are the nature and regularities of microgenesis the same when
an external stimulus is becoming microgenetically formed
and when a memory-image of the same stimulus is evoked
and formed? More generally: are the curves of formation
and disformation similar for all the transitions occurring at
the threshold of consciousness? There are many examples of
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transitions in and out of consciousness. Can one benefit from
the knowledge gathered while studying brief visual stimuli to
understand processes that unfold with other types of stimuli?
To understand this last question, let us list some examples about
the transition into consciousness to illustrate the heterogeneity
of this kind of transformation: remembering an item or idea
as cued by external instruction or question; remembering an
item or idea as ignited by intrinsic associative cues; having an
insight; experience of an external sensory stimulus after its initial
pre-conscious processing; experience of an already presented
stimulus after focusing attention on it; becoming consciously
aware of an intention (agency) to act after preconscious
preprocessing of the action decision; becoming consciously
aware of a different aspect (feature, attribute, property, quality)
of a stimulus or scene after the preceding consciously aware
experience of some other aspect(s); noticing the change in a
change-blindness display; noticing the target in an inattentional
blindness experiment; becoming consciously aware of the Gestalt
content in Mooney face or Dalmatian dog types of image after an
initially “meaningless” experience; becoming aware of the words
within the sine-wave speech recording; reversal of binocular-
rivalry dominance in becoming aware of the suppressed stimulus;
reappearance of the sensory afterimage. Is in all of these cases
the emergence of conscious content gradually evolving over
time?
There are also many examples for the transition out of
consciousness: fading of the conscious percept; fading of iconic
memory; loss of thought or imagery content; loss of explicitly
experienced WM content; loss of conscious awareness of a
stimulus after refocusing attention elsewhere; loss of a certain
aspect (feature, attribute, quality) of conscious perception of a
discontinued stimulation while other aspect(s) sustain; loss of
conscious perception of a binocular-rivalry stimulus when it
becomes suppressed; fading of perceptual content (e.g., color,
spatial contrast modulation, luminance contrast step gradient)
due to sensory adaptation; fading of afterimage. Is the fading of
conscious content gradually evolving over time in all of these
cases?
Gathering such a list leads yet again to interesting questions.
For example, which transitions are reversible and which ones
not? Loss of formed Gestalt content back to meaningless
array of elements seems difficult; re-establishment of change-
blindness/inattentional blindness seems impossible; after hearing
the words within the sine-wave speech it is impossible to go back
to hearing noise. What could this small set of non-reversibility
tell us about the neural mechanisms of consciousness? The list
of these phenomena seems to suggest that conscious experience
is heavily influenced by prior knowledge—once insightful
knowledge about a particular stimulus is established, it is hard
or even impossible to remove it.
More importantly, the variety of examples leads to the
question whether there are general mechanisms and regularities
underlying all of these phenomena. Do all these other types of
transitions share some of the key features with the transitions
happening in visual perception (Figure 1)? In visual perception
it is relatively straightforward to “slice up” perception with
techniques like visual masking (Bachmann, 1994; Bachmann
and Francis, 2013), but even then studying the time course of
visual perception is a time consuming and a difficult endeavor
(Bachmann, 2000). Is it possible or even meaningful to try to
do it with other types of transitions? How would one proceed
with “slicing up” memory retrieval, Gestalt perception or insight
formation? We do not have definitive experimental approaches,
but we consider these questions to be important to put forth and
to explore.
The present manuscript had a few aims: (1) we wanted to
emphasize that conscious content evolves and changes over
time, (2) we noted that the exact time course of how conscious
content evolves over time is yet unknown and tentatively drew
a time course to provoke more research in this direction,
(3) we wanted to demonstrate that thinking about the time
course of conscious processing prompts many interesting and
intriguing questions, (4) finally we asked how general are such
microgenetic regularities—do all kinds of transitions in and
out of consciousness have gradual formation and disformation
(Figure 1)? On the way we also seem to have stumbled on
a few novel concepts applicable in studying dynamics of
conscious experience—the formation/disformation (a)symmetry,
reversibility, and the possibility of having two different NCCs for
the same perceived object. We hope that some of these ideas and
concepts are beneficial for unraveling the neural mechanisms of
consciousness.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
TB conceived the initial ideas, JA expanded them, both JA and TB
discussed the ideas and contributed to writing the manuscript
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is partly supported by institutional Grant IUT20-40
from Estonian Ministry of Education and Research.
REFERENCES
Aru, J., Bachmann, T., Singer, W., and Melloni, L. (2012). Distilling the
neural correlates of consciousness. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 36, 737–746.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.003
Aru, J., Rutiku, R., Wibral, M., Singer, W., and Melloni, L. (2016). Early
effects of previous experience on conscious perception. Neurosci. Conscious.
2016:niw004. doi: 10.1093/nc/niw004
Bachmann, T. (1980). Genesis of a subjective image. Acta et Commentationes Univ.
Tartuensis. Prob. Cogn. Psychol. 522, 102–126.
Bachmann, T. (1994). Psychophysiology of Visual Masking: The Fine Structure of
Conscious Experience. Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Bachmann, T. (2000). Microgenetic Approach to the Conscious Mind. Amsterdam;
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Bachmann, T. (2009). Finding ERP-signatures of target awareness: puzzle persists
because of experimental co-variation of the objective and subjective variables.
Conscious. Cogn. 18, 804–808. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.02.011
Bachmann, T. (2012). How to begin to overcome the ambiguity present in
differentiation between contents and levels of consciousness? Front. Psychol.
3:82. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00082
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 128
Aru and Bachmann In and Out of Consciousness
Bachmann, T. (2015). On the brain-imaging markers of neural correlates of
consciousness. Front. Psychol. 6:868. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00868
Bachmann, T., and Francis, G. (2013). Visual masking: Studying Perception,
Attention, and Consciousness. San Diego, CA; Oxford: Elsevier; Academic Press.
Breitmeyer, B. G. (2014). The Visual (Un)conscious & Its (Dis)contents. Oxford:
OUP.
Campana, F., Rebollo, I., Urai, A., Wyart, V., and Tallon-Baudry, C.
(2016). Conscious vision proceeds from global to local content in
goal-directed tasks and spontaneous vision. J. Neurosci. 36, 5200–5213.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3619-15.2016
Carlson, T., Tovar, D. A., Alink, A., and Kriegeskorte, N. (2013). Representational
dynamics of object vision: the first 1000 ms. J. Vis. 13, 1. doi: 10.1167/13.10.1
Carrasco, M., Ling, S., and Read, S. (2004). Attention alters appearance. Nat.
Neurosci. 7, 308–313. doi: 10.1038/nn1194
Cichy, R. M., Pantazis, D., and Oliva, A. (2014). Resolving human object
recognition in space and time.Nat. Neurosci. 17, 455–462. doi: 10.1038/nn.3635
De Graaf, T. A., Hsieh, P. J., and Sack, A. T. (2012). The ‘correlates’ in
neural correlates of consciousness. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 36, 191–197.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.05.012
Del Cul, A., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S. (2007). Brain dynamics underlying
the nonlinear threshold for access to consciousness. PLoS Biol. 5:e260.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0050260
Goddard, E., Carlson, T. A., Dermody, N., and Woolgar, A. (2016).
Representational dynamics of object recognition: feedforward
and feedback information flows. Neuroimage 128, 385–397
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.01.006
Hegdé, J. (2008). Time course of visual perception: coarse-to-fine processing and
beyond. Prog. Neurobiol. 84, 405–439. doi: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2007.09.001
Herzog, M. H., Kammer, T., and Scharnowski, F. (2016). Time
slices: what is the duration of a percept? PLoS Biol. 14:e1002433.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1002433
Hochstein, S., and Ahissar, M. (2002). View from the top: hierarchies
and reverse hierarchies in the visual system. Neuron 36, 791–804.
doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(02)01091-7
Husserl, E. (1928). Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Jahrbuch für
Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung 9, 367–498.
Kalmus, M., and Bachmann, T. (1980). Perceptual microgenesis of complex visual
pattern: comparison of methods and possible implications for future studies.
Acta et Commentationes Univ. Tartuensis Actual Prob. Indus. Psychol. 529,
135–159.
Koivisto, M., and Revonsuo, A. (2010). Event-related brain potential
correlates of visual awareness. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 34, 922–934.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.12.002
Koivisto, M., Kainulainen, P., and Revonsuo, A. (2009). The relationship between
awareness and attention: evidence from ERP responses. Neuropsychologia 47,
2891–2899. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.06.016
Miller, S. M. (2007). On the correlation/constitution distinction problem
(and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness.
Acta Neuropsychiatr. 19, 159–176. doi: 10.1111/j.1601-5215.2007.
00207.x
Overgaard, M., Rote, J., Mouridsen, K., and Ramsøy, T. Z. (2006). Is
conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report
methodologies during a visual task. Conscious. Cogn. 15, 700–708.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.04.002
Pitts, M. A., Metzler, S., and Hillyard, S. A. (2014). Isolating neural correlates
of conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one’s perception.
Front. Psychol. 5:1078. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01078
Rutiku, R., Aru, J., and Bachmann, T. (2016). General markers of conscious
visual perception and their timing. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 10:23.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00023
Rutiku, R., Martin, M., Bachmann, T., and Aru, J. (2015). Does the P300
reflect conscious perception or its consequences? Neuroscience 298, 180–189.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroscience.2015.04.029
Sergent, C., and Dehaene, S. (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon?
Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink. Psychol.
Sci. 15, 720–728. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00748.x
Sergent, C., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S. (2005). Timing of the brain events
underlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink. Nat. Neurosci.
8, 1391–1400. doi: 10.1038/nn1549
Sligte, I. G., Scholte, H. S., and Lamme, V. A. (2008). Are there
multiple visual short-term memory stores? PLoS ONE 3:e1699.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0001699
Soto, D., Wriglesworth, A., Bahrami-Balani, A., and Humphreys, G. W. (2010).
Working memory enhances visual perception: evidence from signal detection
analysis. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 36, 441. doi: 10.1037/a0
018686
Timmermans, B., and Cleeremans, A. (2015). “Chapter 3: How can we
measure awareness? An overview of current methods,” in Behavioral
Methods in Consciousness Research, ed M. Overgaard (Oxford: OUP),
21–46.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Aru and Bachmann. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 128
